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a b s t r a c t
We focus on the problem of computing an -Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, when 
is an absolute constant.Wepresent a simple algorithm for computing a 34 -Nash equilibrium
for any bimatrix game in strongly polynomial time and we next show how to extend this
algorithm so as to obtain a (potentially stronger) parameterized approximation. Namely,
we present an algorithm that computes a 2+λ4 -Nash equilibrium, where λ is the minimum,
among all Nash equilibria, expected payoff of either player. The suggested algorithm runs
in time polynomial in the number of strategies available to the players.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation, framework and overview
Non-cooperative game theory has been extensively used in understanding the phenomena observed when decision
makers interact. A game consists of a set of players, and each player has a set of strategies available to her as well as a
payoff function mapping each strategy profile (i.e. each combination of strategies, one for each player) to a real number
that captures the preferences of the player over the possible outcomes of the game. The most important solution concept in
non-cooperative game theory is the notion of Nash equilibrium [15]: it is a strategy profile such that no player would have
an incentive to unilaterally deviate from her strategy, i.e. no player could increase her payoff by choosing another strategy
while the rest of the players persevered their strategies.
Despite the certain existence of such equilibria [15], the problem of finding any Nash equilibrium even for games
involving only two players has been recently proved to be complete in the PPAD (polynomial parity argument, directed
version) class, introduced by Papadimitriou [16]. This fact led to the emergence of the computation of approximate Nash
equilibria, also referred to as -Nash equilibria. An -Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no deviating player
could achieve a payoff higher than the one that the specific profile gives her, plus .
In this work, we focus on the problem of approximating Nash equilibria of 2-player games. We propose simple and
efficient algorithms for computing -Nash equilibria of such games, for sufficiently small absolute constants .
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1.2. Related work
Nash [15] introduced the concept of Nash equilibria in non-cooperative games and proved that any game possesses at
least one such equilibrium; however, the computational complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium used to be a wide open
problem for several years. Awell-known algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium of a gamewith 2 players is the Lemke–
Howson algorithm [13], however it has exponential worst-case running time in the number of available pure strategies. A
simple Las Vegas algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium in 2-player random games was presented in [2]; this algorithm
always finds an equilibrium, and it runs in polynomial time with high probability.
Daskalakis et al. [7] showed that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a gamewith 4 ormore players is PPAD-
complete; this result was extended to games with 3 players [10,4]. Eventually, Chen and Deng [5] proved that the problem
is PPAD-complete for bimatrix games in which each player has n available pure strategies.
In [14], following similar techniques as in [1], it was shown that, for any bimatrix game and for any constant  > 0,
there exists an -Nash equilibrium with only logarithmic support (in the number n of available pure strategies). This result
directly yields a quasi-polynomial (nO(ln n)) algorithm for computing such an approximate equilibrium.
In [6] it was shown that the problem of computing a 1
nΘ(1)
-Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete, and that bimatrix games
are unlikely to have a fully polynomial time approximation scheme (unless PPAD⊆ P). However, it was conjectured that it
is unlikely that finding an -Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete when  is an absolute constant.
Independently from our work, Daskalakis et al. [8] show how to compute an 1/2-Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game.
Later, therewas a series of results improving the constant for polynomial time constructions of approximate Nash equilibria.
A polynomial construction (based on Linear Programming) of a 0.38-Nash equilibrium is presented in [9], and consequently
Bosse et al. [3] proposed a 0.36392-Nash equilibrium based on the solvability of zero-sumbimatrix games. Finally, Tsaknakis
and Spirakis [17] proposed a new methodology for determining approximate Nash equilibria of bimatrix games and based
on that, they provided a polynomial time algorithm for computing 0.3393-approximate Nash equilibria. To our knowledge
this is currently the best result for approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games.
For the more demanding notion of well-supported approximate Nash equilibrium, (that is, an approximate Nash
equilibrium where each player plays with positive probability only approximate best responses) Daskalakis et al. [8]
propose an algorithm, which, under a graph theoretic conjecture, constructs in polynomial time a 56 -well-supported Nash
equilibrium. In [8] it is also shown how to transform a [0, 1]-bimatrix game to a win–lose bimatrix game (i.e. a bimatrix
game where each matrix entry is either 0 or 1) of the same size, so that each -well-supported Nash equilibrium of the
resulting game is 1+2 -well-supported Nash equilibrium of the original game.
Thework of [11] provides a polynomial algorithm that computes a 12 -well-supported Nash equilibrium for arbitrarywin–
lose games. The idea behind this algorithm is to split evenly the divergence from a zero-sum game between the two players
and then solve this zero-sum game in polynomial time (using its direct connection to Linear Programming). The computed
Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game considered is indeed proved to be also a 12 -well-supported Nash equilibrium for the
initial win–lose game.
In the same work, Kontogiannis and Spirakis [11] parameterize the above methodology in order to apply it to arbitrary
bimatrix games. This new technique leads to a weaker φ-well-supported Nash equilibrium for win–lose games, where
φ =
√
5−1
2 is the golden ratio. Nevertheless, this parameterized technique extends nicely to a technique for arbitrary bimatrix
games, which ensures a
(√
11
2 − 1
)
-well-supported Nash equilibrium in polynomial time.
1.3. Our results
In this work, we deal with the problem of computing an -Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, for some constant .
We first present a simple algorithm for computing a 34 -Nash equilibrium for any bimatrix game in strongly polynomial time
(Lemma 3.1).
Next we show how to extend this result so as to obtain a parameterized and potentially stronger approximation. More
specifically, we present an algorithm that computes a 2+λ4 -Nash equilibrium, where λ is the minimum, among all Nash
equilibria, expected payoff of either player (Theorem 4.1). The suggested algorithm runs in time polynomial in the number
of strategies available to the players.
1.4. Organization
In Section 2 we present the notation used throughout this paper, together with the definitions of bimatrix games, Nash
equilibria and approximate Nash equilibria, and we formally state and discuss the results of [6,14] on the problem of
approximating Nash equilibria.
Our first algorithm for computing a 34 -Nash equilibrium is described in Section 3, while in Section 4 we present an
extension of this algorithm that can give a stronger approximation. We conclude, in Section 5, with a discussion of our
results and suggestions for further research.
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2. Background
2.1. Notation
For an integer n, let [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. For an n× 1 vector x we denote by x1, x2, . . . xn the components of x and by xT
the transpose of x. For an n×mmatrix A, we denote ai,j the element in the ith row and jth column of A. For an n×mmatrix
A and a constant c ∈ R, we denote cA the n×mmatrix resulting after multiplying each element of A by c . Let Pn be the set
of all probability vectors in n dimensions, i.e.
Pn ≡
{
x ∈ Rn :
n∑
i=1
xi = 1 and xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n]
}
.
Denote Rn×m[0:1] the set of all n×mmatrices with real entries between 0 and 1, i.e.
Rn×m[0:1] ≡
{
A ∈ Rn×m : 0 ≤ ai,j ≤ 1 for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]
}
.
2.2. Bimatrix games
A non-cooperative game Γ = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 consists of (i) a finite set of players N , (ii) a non-empty finite set of pure
strategies Si for each player i ∈ N and (iii) a payoff function ui : ×i∈NSi → R for each player i ∈ N .
Bimatrix games [12,13] are a special case of 2-player games (i.e. |N| = 2) such that the payoff functions can be described
by two real n × mmatrices A and B, where n = |S1| and m = |S2|. More specifically, the n rows of A, B represent the pure
strategies of the first player (the row player) and the m columns represent the pure strategies of the second player (the
column player). Then, when the row player chooses strategy i and the column player chooses strategy j, the former gets
payoff ai,j while the latter gets payoff bi,j. Based on this observation, bimatrix games are denoted by Γ = 〈A, B〉.
A mixed strategy for player i ∈ N is a probability distribution on the set of her pure strategies Si. In a bimatrix game
Γ = 〈A, B〉, a mixed strategy for the row player can be expressed as a probability vector x ∈ Pn while a mixed strategy for
the column player can be expressed as a probability vector y ∈ Pm. When the row player chooses mixed strategy x and the
column player chooses y, then the players get expected payoffs xTAy (row player) and xTBy (column player). The support of
a mixed strategy is the set of pure strategies that are assigned non-zero probability.
2.3. Nash equilibria and -Nash equilibria
A Nash equilibrium [15] for a game Γ is a combination of (pure or mixed) strategies, one for each player, such that no
player could increase her payoff by unilaterally changing her strategy. We formally give the definition of a Nash equilibrium
and an -Nash equilibrium for a bimatrix game.
Definition 2.1 (Nash Equilibrium). A pair of strategies (x˜, y˜) is a Nash equilibrium for the bimatrix game Γ = 〈A, B〉 if:
(i) For every (mixed) strategy x of the row player, xTAy˜ ≤ x˜TAy˜ and
(ii) For every (mixed) strategy y of the column player, x˜TBy ≤ x˜TBy˜.
Definition 2.2 (-Nash Equilibrium). For any  > 0 a pair of strategies (xˆ, yˆ) is an -Nash equilibrium for the bimatrix game
Γ = 〈A, B〉 if:
(i) For every (mixed) strategy x of the row player, xTAyˆ ≤ xˆTAyˆ+ , and
(ii) For every (mixed) strategy y of the column player, xˆTBy ≤ xˆTByˆ+ .
Remark 2.3. From now on we denote by (x˜, y˜) an arbitrary Nash equilibrium of 〈A, B〉 and by (xˆ, yˆ) an arbitrary -Nash
equilibrium of 〈A, B〉, for some constant  > 0 that will be clear from the context.
2.4. Positively normalized bimatrix games
As pointed out in [6], since the notion of -Nash equilibria is defined in the additive fashion, it is important to consider
bimatrix games with normalized matrices so as to study their complexity. That is, the absolute value of each entry in the
matrices is bounded, for example by 1, and there exists an entry in each matrix equal to 1. Lipton et al. [14] also used a
similar normalization, which we adopt in this paper and describe below.
Consider the n×m bimatrix game Γ = 〈A, B〉 and let c, d be two arbitrary positive real constants. Suppose that (x˜, y˜) is
a Nash equilibrium for Γ and (xˆ, yˆ) is an -Nash equilibrium for Γ . Let x and y be any strategy of the row and column player
respectively. Now consider the game Γ ′ = 〈cA, dB〉. Then it holds that
xT(cA)y˜ = cxTAy˜ ≤ cx˜Ay˜ = x˜T(cA)y˜
and, similarly,
x˜T(dB)y ≤ x˜T(dB)y˜.
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Moreover,
xT(cA)yˆ ≤ xˆT(cA)yˆ+ c
and
xˆT(dB)y ≤ xˆT(dB)yˆ+ d.
Hence Γ and Γ ′ have precisely the same set of Nash equilibria; furthermore, any -Nash equilibrium for Γ is an `-Nash
equilibrium for Γ ′ (where ` = max{c, d}) and vice versa.
Now let C be an n×mmatrix such that, for all (columns) j ∈ [m], ci,j = cj ∈ R for all i ∈ [n]. Similarly, let D be an n×m
matrix such that, for all (rows) i ∈ [m], di,j = di ∈ R for all j ∈ [m]. Note that, for every pair x ∈ Pn and y ∈ Pm,
xTCy =
m∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
ci,jxiyj =
m∑
j=1
yj
n∑
i=1
cjxi =
m∑
j=1
cjyj
and
xTDy =
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
di,jxiyj =
n∑
i=1
xi
m∑
j=1
diyj =
n∑
i=1
dixi.
Consider now the game Γ ′′ = 〈C + A,D+ B〉. Then, for all x ∈ Pn,
xT(C + A)y˜ = xTC y˜+ xTAy˜ ≤
m∑
j=1
cjy˜j + x˜TAy˜ = x˜T(C + A)y˜
and similarly, for all y ∈ Pm,
x˜T(D+ B)y ≤ x˜T(D+ B)y˜.
Also, for all x ∈ Pn it holds that
xT(C + A)yˆ = xTC yˆ+ xTAyˆ ≤
m∑
j=1
cjyˆj + xˆTAyˆ+  = xˆT(C + A)yˆ+ 
and similarly, for all y ∈ Pm,
xˆT(D+ B)y ≤ xˆT(D+ B)yˆ+ .
Thus Γ and Γ ′′ are equivalent as regards their sets of Nash equilibria, as well as their sets of -Nash equilibria.
This equivalence allows us to focus only on bimatrix games where the payoffs are between 0 and 1, i.e. on games 〈A, B〉
where A, B ∈ Rm×n[0:1] . Such games are referred to as being positively normalized [6].
2.5. Tractability of -Nash equilibria
Consider a bimatrix game Γ = 〈A, B〉 and let (x˜, y˜) be a Nash equilibrium for Γ . Fix a positive integer k and assume
that we form a multiset S1 by sampling k times from the set of pure strategies of the row player, independently at random
according to the distribution x˜. Similarly, assume we form a multiset S2 by sampling k times from the set of pure strategies
of the column player, independently at random according to the distribution y˜. Let xˆ be the mixed strategy for the row
player that assigns probability 1/k to each member of S1 and 0 to all other pure strategies, and let yˆ be the mixed strategy
for the column player that assigns probability 1/k to each member of S2 and 0 to all other pure strategies. Clearly, if a pure
strategy occurs α times in the multiset, then it is assigned probability α/k. Then xˆ and yˆ are said to be k-uniform [14] and
the following holds:
Theorem 2.4 ([14]). For any Nash equilibrium (x˜, y˜) of a positively normalized n× n bimatrix game and for every  > 0, there
exists, for every k ≥ 12 ln n
2
, a pair of k-uniform strategies xˆ, yˆ such that (xˆ, yˆ) is an -Nash equilibrium.
However,
Theorem 2.5 ([6]). The problem of computing a 1
nΘ(1)
-Nash equilibrium of a positively normalized n×n bimatrix game is PPAD-
complete.
Theorem 2.5 asserts that, unless PPAD ⊆ P, there exists no fully polynomial time approximation scheme for computing
equilibria in bimatrix games. However, this does not rule out the existence of a polynomial approximation scheme for
computing an -Nash equilibriumwhen  is an absolute constant, or evenwhen  = Θ
(
1
poly(ln n)
)
. Furthermore, as observed
in [6], if the problem of finding an -Nash equilibrium were PPAD-complete when  is an absolute constant, then, due to
Theorem 2.4, all PPAD problems would be solved in quasi-polynomial time, which is unlikely to be the case.
3. A 34 -Nash equilibrium
In this section we present a straightforward method for computing a 34 -Nash equilibrium for any positively normalized
bimatrix game.
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Lemma 3.1. Consider any positively normalized n × m bimatrix game Γ = 〈A, B〉 and let ai1,j1 = maxi,j ai,j and bi2,j2 =
maxi,j bi,j. Then the pair of strategies (xˆ, yˆ) where xˆi1 = xˆi2 = yˆj1 = yˆj2 = 12 is a 34 -Nash equilibrium for Γ .
Proof. First observe that
xˆTAyˆ =
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
xˆiyˆjai,j
= xˆi1 yˆj1ai1,j1 + xˆi1 yˆj2ai1,j2 + xˆi2 yˆj1ai2,j1 + xˆj1 yˆj1ai2,j2
= 1
4
(
ai1,j1 + ai1,j2 + ai2,j1 + ai2,j2
)
≥ 1
4
ai1,j1 .
Similarly,
xˆTByˆ =
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
xˆiyˆjbi,j
= xˆi1 yˆj1bi1,j1 + xˆi1 yˆj2bi1,j2 + xˆi2 yˆj1bi2,j1 + xˆj1 yˆj1bi2,j2
= 1
4
(
bi1,j1 + bi1,j2 + bi2,j1 + bi2,j2
)
≥ 1
4
bi2,j2 .
Now observe that, for any (mixed) strategies x and y of the row and column players respectively,
xTAyˆ ≤ ai1,j1 and xˆTBy ≤ bi2,j2
and recall that ai,j, bi,j ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ N , j ∈ M . Hence
xTAyˆ ≤ ai1,j1 =
1
4
ai1,j1 +
3
4
ai1,j1 ≤ xˆTAyˆ+
3
4
and
xˆTBy ≤ bi2,j2 =
1
4
bi2,j2 +
3
4
ai2,j2 ≤ xˆTByˆ+
3
4
.
Thus (xˆ, yˆ) is a 34 -Nash equilibrium for Γ . 
4. A parameterized approximation
We now proceed in extending the technique used in the proof of Lemma 3.1 so as to obtain a parameterized, stronger
approximation.
Theorem 4.1. Consider a positively normalized n× m bimatrix game Γ = 〈A, B〉. Let λ∗1 (λ∗2) be the minimum, among all Nash
equilibria of Γ , expected payoff for the row (column) player and let λ = max{λ∗1, λ∗2}. Then, there exists a 2+λ4 -Nash equilibrium
that can be computed in time polynomial in n and m.
Proof. Observe that, for any pair of strategies x, y of the row and column players respectively, it holds that xTAy ∈ [0, 1]
and xTBy ∈ [0, 1]. Consider the following linear programs LP1 and LP2:
LP1 LP2
minimize t
subject to
∑m
j=1 ai,jyj ≤ t ∀i ∈ [n]∑m
j=1 yj = 1
yj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ [m]
minimize s
subject to
∑n
j=1 bi,jxi ≤ s ∀j ∈ [m]∑n
i=1 xi = 1
xi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n]
Let t∗, y∗ and s∗, x∗ correspond to the optimal solutions of LP1 and LP2 respectively. Then, there exists at least one row
r ∈ [n] such that∑j ar,jy∗j = t∗. Similarly, there exists at least one column c ∈ [m] such that∑i bi,cx∗i = s∗.
Let λ∗1 be the minimum, among all Nash equilibria of Γ , expected payoff for the row player and let (x˜′, y˜′) be the
corresponding Nash equilibrium. Then λ∗1, y˜′ is a feasible solution for LP1, thus t∗ ≤ λ∗1 . Similarly, let λ∗2 be the minimum,
among all Nash equilibria of Γ , expected payoff for the row player and let (x˜′′, y˜′′) be the corresponding Nash equilibrium.
Then λ∗2, y˜′′ is a feasible solution for LP2, thus s∗ ≤ λ∗2 . Now let λ = max{λ∗1, λ∗2}. Thus t∗ ≤ λ and s∗ ≤ λ.
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Now consider the pair of strategies (xˆ, yˆ) for the row and column players respectively defined as follows:
xˆi = x
∗
i
2
∀i ∈ [n] − {r}
xˆr = x
∗
r
2
+ 1
2
yˆj =
y∗j
2
∀j ∈ [m] − {c}
yˆc = y
∗
c
2
+ 1
2
.
Observe that
xˆTAyˆ =
n∑
i=1
xˆi
m∑
j=1
yˆjai,j
=
∑
i6=r
x∗i
2
∑
j6=c
y∗j
2
ai,j +
∑
i6=r
x∗i
2
(
y∗c
2
+ 1
2
)
ai,c +
(
x∗r
2
+ 1
2
)∑
j6=c
y∗j
2
ar,j +
(
x∗r
2
+ 1
2
)(
y∗c
2
+ 1
2
)
ar,c
≥ 1
4
m∑
j=1
ar,jy∗j
= t
∗
4
.
Furthermore, for each row i ∈ [n],
m∑
j=1
yˆjai,j =
m∑
j=1
y∗j
2
ai,j + 12ai,c
≤ t
∗
2
+ 1
2
≤ xˆTAyˆ+ 2+ t
∗
4
≤ xˆTAyˆ+ 2+ λ
4
.
Similarly,
xˆTByˆ =
m∑
j=1
yˆj
n∑
i=1
xˆibi,j
=
∑
j6=c
y∗j
2
∑
i6=r
x∗i
2
bi,j +
∑
j6=c
y∗j
2
(
x∗r
2
+ 1
2
)
br,j +
(
y∗c
2
+ 1
2
)∑
i6=r
x∗i
2
bi,c +
(
y∗c
2
+ 1
2
)(
x∗r
2
+ 1
2
)
br,c
≥ 1
4
n∑
i=1
bi,cx∗i
= s
∗
4
and, for each column j ∈ [m],
n∑
i=1
xˆibi,j =
n∑
i=1
x∗i
2
bi,j + 12br,j
≤ s
∗
2
+ 1
2
≤ xˆTByˆ+ 2+ s
∗
4
≤ xˆTByˆ+ 2+ λ
4
.
Thus, (xˆ, yˆ) is a 2+λ4 -Nash equilibrium for Γ that can be computed in polynomial time. 
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Note that, for any bimatrix game Γ = 〈A, B〉, we can check in polynomial time whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in
which each player chooses with probability 1 one of her pure strategies (i.e. a pure Nash equilibrium). If there exists such an
equilibrium, then we can find it in polynomial time and there is no point in searching for -Nash equilibria. On the other
hand, if all Nash equilibria are not pure, then the payoff of either player is strictly less than 1, hence λ = max{λ∗1, λ∗2} < 1.
Thus 2+λ4 <
3
4 , ensuring that the algorithm described in the above proof yields a stronger approximation than the one
presented in Section 3.
4.1. An application
The approximation factor achieved by the algorithm we just described depends on λ∗1 and λ
∗
2 . We believe that, in most
situations, there exists a Nash equilibrium such that the payoff of the row player is small, and that there exists a (possibly
different) Nash equilibrium such that the payoff of the column player is small, and thus the approximation achieved is close
to 12 .
As an example, consider the n × n generalized matching pennies game Γ = 〈A, B〉 where A and B are described as
follows:
ai,j =
{
1 if i = j
0 else
bi,j =
{
1 if j = i(mod n)+ 1
0 else .
Observe that the pair of strategies (x˜, y˜)where x˜i = y˜i = 1n for all i ∈ [n] is a Nash equilibrium of the generalized matching
pennies game. Indeed, for any x, y ∈ Pn,
xTAy˜ = 1
n2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ai,j = 1n2 n =
1
n
= x˜TAy˜
x˜TBy = 1
n2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
bi,j = 1n2 n =
1
n
= x˜TBy˜.
Thus (x˜, y˜) is a Nash equilibrium1 that gives each player a payoff equal to 1n . By applying Theorem 4.1, we can obtain
in polynomial time a 1+1/n2 -Nash equilibrium. Thus we can guarantee an approximation factor that tends to
1
2 as
n→∞.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we tried to approximate, within a constant additive factor, the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium
in an arbitrary n×m bimatrix game.
The (additive) approximation parameter achieved by the algorithm described in the above proof of Theorem 4.1 depends
on λ∗1 and λ
∗
2 , i.e. theminimum payoff, over all Nash equilibria, for the row and column players respectively. Observe that, as
long as not allNash equilibria of the game give payoffs very close to 1 for either player, the algorithm gives an approximation
very close to 12 . In otherwords, it suffices that there exists a Nash equilibrium that gives the rowplayer a payoff close to 0 and
a Nash equilibrium (not necessarily the same!) that gives the column player a payoff close to 0 so that the approximation
achieved can be ensured to be close to 12 . Furthermore, this is just a sufficient and not a necessary condition: recall that we
only used λ∗1 and λ
∗
2 so as to prove the existence of feasible solutions to some linear constraints.
Furthermore, for both Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 4.1, we used a factor of 12 to deal with the underlying Linear
Complementarity Problem. More specifically, we tried to compute independently for each player a strategy that guarantees
her a sufficiently large payoff, and then we ‘‘merged’’ in an equivalent way the strategies found with the ones needed by
the other player so as to approximate a Nash equilibrium. We observed that, for the specific algorithms presented in these
results, this factor of 12 is optimal.
Albeit simple, we believe that the techniques described here are a first step towards establishing whether there exists
any approximation scheme for computing an -Nash equilibrium and that our methods can be extended in order to achieve
stronger approximations to the problem of finding Nash equilibria of bimatrix games.
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